We are also working though the World Trade Organization to address continuing challenges to fair competition. Take government procurement. The purchases that governments make represent an important part of the global economy, and citizens everywhere deserve to know that their governments are getting the best product at the best prices. Consistent with the WTO Government Procurement Agreement that we signed, America lets companies from other nations who have signed that same agreement compete for appropriate American Government contracts. We would naturally expect countries that want access to our government contracts to offer our companies genuine access to theirs in return.

我們還正通過世界貿易組織來努力解決公平競爭不斷面臨的問題。例如政府采購問題。政府所進行的采購代表著全球經濟的重要部分，任何地區的公民均有權知道政府是在以最好的價格購買最佳產品。根據我們簽署的世界貿易組織《政府采購協議》,美國允許其他簽署了同樣協議的國家的公司競爭適宜的美國政府合同。我們當然希望那些想獲得我國政府合同機會的國家也真誠地為我們的公司提供競爭對方政府合同的機會。

Across the full spectrum of international institutions—the G8 and G20, the IMF, OECD, ILO, WTO, and others—we are working to level playing fields and encourage robust and fair economic activity. Just as the WTO eliminated harmful tariffs in the 1990s, today we need institutions capable of providing solutions to new challenges, from some activities of state-owned enterprises to the kinds of barriers emerging behind borders.

我們還通過各種國際機構組織——如8國集團、20國集團、國際貨幣基金組織、經合組織、國際勞工組織、世貿組織等——來努力實現平等的競爭環境，鼓勵健全而公平的經濟活動。正如上世紀90年代世貿組織廢除了有害的關稅，今天我們需要有一些機構來提供辦法，解決從國有企業的某些活動到境內出現壁壘等新問題。

We also support innovative partnerships that develop norms and rules to address these new concerns. We should build on the model of the Santiago Principles on sovereign wealth funds, which were negotiated jointly by host governments, recipient governments, the World Bank, IMF, OECD, and the sovereign funds themselves. This code of conduct governing sovereign investment practices has reassured stakeholders — investor nations, recipient nations, and the private sector. And it may prove a useful model for other shared challenges, like ensuring that state-owned companies and enterprises compete on the same terms as private companies.

我們支持有創意的合作關系，針對這些新問題制定標準和規則。我們應借鑒有關主權財富基金的《圣地亞哥原則》模式，這些原則是由東道國政府、接受國政府、世界銀行、國際貨幣基金組織、經合組織以及主權基金等共同談判而成。管理主權投資活動的行為準則消除了利益相關方——如投資國、接受國、以及私營公司——的疑慮。這對于解決其他共同的問題或許是一個有用的模式，如確保國有公司和企業與民間公司按照同樣的規則進行競爭。

As a second step, we are pursuing new cutting-edge trade deals that raise the standards for fair competition even as they open new markets. For instance, the Korea-US Free Trade Agreement, or KORUS, will eliminate tariffs on 95 percent of US consumer and industrial exports within five years. Its tariff reductions alone could increase exports of American goods by more than $10 billion and help South Korea's economy grow by 6 percent. So, whether you are an American manufacturer of machinery or a Korean chemicals exporter, this deal lowers the barriers to reaching new customers.

第二個步驟是，我們將謀求一種新型的貿易協定，使它們在開拓新市場同時，提升公平競爭的標準。例如,《韓國與美國自由貿易協定》,即KORUS，將在5年時間內取消美國 95%的消費品和工業出口產品關稅。僅消除關稅就能為美國出口產品帶來100億美元以上的增長，并促使韓國經濟增長6%。所以，無論是美國機械制造商，還是韓國化學品出口商，這一協定均為獲得新客戶減少了障礙。

But this trade deal isn't simply about who pays what tariff at our borders. It is a deeper commitment to creating conditions that let both our nations prosper as our companies compete fairly. KORUS includes significant improvements on intellectual property, fair labor practices, environmental protection and regulatory due process.

然而，這項貿易協定并非只涉及誰在我們的邊界支付多少關稅的問題。它是更深一層的承諾，即創造條件，讓兩國在彼此公司的公平競爭中走向繁榮。《韓國與美國自由貿易協定》涵蓋了在知識產權、公正對待勞工、環保及正當監管程序上的明顯改進。

And let me add that the benefits of KORUS extend beyond the economic bottom line. Because this agreement represents a powerful strategic bet. It signals that America and South Korea are partners for the long term—economically, diplomatically, people to people. So, for all these reasons, President Obama is pursuing congressional approval of KORUS, together with necessary Trade Adjustment Assistance, as soon as possible. He is also pursuing passage of the Colombia and Panamanian Free Trade Agreements as well.

讓我補充一點——該協定的好處不限于經濟底線。它意味著有力的戰略性抉擇。它標志著，美國與韓國在經濟、外交和民間交流領域是長期合作伙伴。因此，奧巴馬總統正在謀求國會盡快批準《韓國與美國自由貿易協定》,以及必要的“貿易調整援助”計劃。他也在謀求批準與哥倫比亞和與巴拿馬的自由貿易協定。

Now, we have learned that, in our system, getting trade deals right is challenging, painstaking work. But it's essential. We consider KORUS a model agreement. Asian nations have signed over 100 bilateral trade deals in less than a decade, but many of those agreements fall short on key protections for businesses, workers, and consumers. There are a lot of bells and whistles, but many of the hard questions are glossed over or avoided.

我們認識到，在我們的體制內，達成適中的貿易協定要通過艱難和痛苦的努力。但它十分重要。我們認為《韓國與美國自由貿易協定》是一個典范協定。在過去不到10年時間內，亞洲國家簽署了100多項雙邊貿易協議，但許多這類協議未能為商家、工人和消費者提供關鍵性的保護。它們在形式上應有盡有，但忽視或規避了許多艱難的問題。

Beyond that, there is now a danger of creating a hodgepodge of inconsistent and partial bilateral agreements which may lower tariffs, but which also create new inefficiencies and dizzying complexities. A small electronics shop, for example, in the Philippines might import alarm clocks from China under one free trade agreement, calculators from Malaysia under another, and so on—each with its own obscure rules and mountains of paperwork—until it no longer even makes sense to take advantage of the trade agreements at all. Instead, we should aim for true regional integration.

除此之外，現在還存在著另一種危險性，即五花八門、缺乏一致性和完整性的雙邊協議。這些協議可能降低一些關稅，同時卻會導致新的低效率與令人眼花繚亂的復雜規定。例如，在菲律賓的一家小型電子產品商店有可能根據一項自由貿易協議從中國進口鬧鐘，但根據另一項協議從馬來西亞進口計算器，以此類推——每一項協議都有其晦澀難懂的規則并需要準備堆積如山的文件——直至這些貿易協議變得毫無意義，其所能提供的益處不復存在。我們的努力方向應當與之相反，即真正實現地區一體化。

That is the spirit behind the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the so-called TPP, which we hope to outline by the time of APEC in November, because this agreement will bring together economies from across the Pacific—developed and developing alike—into a single trading community.

這就是跨太平洋伙伴關系——簡稱“TPP”——倡導的精神。我們希望在今年11月亞太經合組織開會時概述它的內容，因為這項協議將匯集整個太平洋地區的各經濟體——無論是發達國家還是發展中國家——使之成為一個統一的貿易體。